"intuitive" sense of the good and at the same time retains a suspicion of systematicity. Ethical inquiry in this space urgently reminds us that because ethical systems are so seductive, those who aim to form these systems must be extraordinarily careful.
It is into this space of "after" that Peter Haas jumps with his book Morality after Auschwitz: The Radical Challenge of the Nazi Ethic.
1 The "radical challenge" he presents to us is to enter into the Nazi worldview, to assume the existence of an internal logic and a governing system of values, that is, an ethic, and to use the logic of this worldview to attempt to understand the action "necessitated" by it. Haas assumes that there is an inextricable connection between metaphysics and ethics-that the way a world looks is a crucial factor in determining the type of behavior such a world expects of its inhabitants. He calls into question any assumptions of a shared "human" community and instead operates on a localized level; he launches us full force into the realm of the particular, shattering any reliance on a "universal" ethic we may want to bring to bear on the matter. Unsettling though it may be to make the kinds of assumptions Haas asks us to make, his challenge is nevertheless a profoundly useful one. In giving us no recourse to transcendent notions of good or evil, which we might then indiscriminately impose, Haas forces us to consider that systems of value are constructed from a space of the deepest interiority. These systems are so tightly woven, so thoroughly binding, that we need to enter into them to crack them open.
This "entering into," as it were, challenges us also to acknowledge the deliberately discursive element of ethics construction. Haas suggests that the project of ethics building is semantically precarious, primarily because any given ethical system is sustained and reinforced through discourse and rhetoric aimed at such reinforcement. He argues:
My theory is that the way a culture formally symbolizes and then talks about evil will determine the kinds of phenomena it will view as evil. Thus we move from basic formal patterns of how we think, to the overt symbolization of these in discourse, to the application of this discourse to the evaluation of real-life phenomena. . . . The Holocaust . . . is a case study of the most graphic sort of how one ethical system can be radically remade at the discursive level and yet continue to motivate because it retains its form and so its power. (6-8)
